{"id":9634,"date":"2026-04-13T23:41:38","date_gmt":"2026-04-13T23:41:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/4-ways-the-war-in-iran-has-weakened-the-us-in-the-great-power-game\/"},"modified":"2026-04-13T23:41:38","modified_gmt":"2026-04-13T23:41:38","slug":"4-ways-the-war-in-iran-has-weakened-the-us-in-the-great-power-game","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/4-ways-the-war-in-iran-has-weakened-the-us-in-the-great-power-game\/","title":{"rendered":"4 ways the war in Iran has weakened the US in the great power\u00a0game"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<p>\u201cNever interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake\u201d\u2014Napoleon Bonaparte\u2019s\u00a0maxim\u2014may well have been in the minds of policymakers in Moscow and Beijing these past weeks, as the U.S. war in Iran dragged on. And now that a 14-day ceasefire between Tehran and Washington is in effect, with both sides claiming \u201cvictory,\u201d\u00a0Russian and Chinese leaders still have an opportunity to profit from what many see as America\u2019s\u00a0latest folly\u00a0in the Middle East.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Throughout the weeks-long conflict,\u00a0China\u00a0and\u00a0Russia\u00a0struck a delicate balance. Both declined to give Iran \u2013 seen to a\u00a0varying degree\u00a0as an\u00a0ally\u00a0of both nations \u2013 their full-throated support or sink any real costs into the conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, they opted for limited assistance in the form of\u00a0small-scale intelligenceand\u00a0diplomatic support.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>As a\u00a0scholar\u00a0of international security and great power politics, I believe that is for good reason. Beijing and Moscow were fully aware that Iran could not \u201cwin\u201d against the combined military might of the United States and Israel. Rather, Iran just needed to survive to serve the interests of Washington\u2019s main geopolitical rivals.<\/p>\n<p>Below are four ways in which the U.S. war in Iran has damaged Washington\u2019s position in the great power rivalries of the 21st century.<\/p>\n<h2>1. Losing the influence war in the Middle East<\/h2>\n<p>As I explore in my book \u201cDefending Frenemies,\u201d the U.S. has long struggled to balance competing objectives in the Middle East. During the Cold War, this meant limiting the\u00a0Soviet Union\u2019s influence\u00a0in the region, while contending with the development of nuclear weapons by two troublesome allies, Israel and Pakistan.<\/p>\n<p>By the 2020s, the priorities in Washington were aimed at restricting the\u00a0influence\u00a0of the U.S.\u2019s great power rivals\u2013 China and to a lesser degree Russia \u2013 in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<p>Yet under Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, China and Russia have sought to\u00a0increase\u00a0their footprint in the region through a variety of formal alliances and informal measures.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>For Russia, this took the form of aligning with Iran, while also partnering with Tehran to\u00a0prop up\u00a0the now-ousted regime of President Bashar Assad during the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, China increased its diplomatic profile in the Middle East, notably by\u00a0acting as a mediator\u00a0as Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic ties in 2023.<\/p>\n<p>The irony of the latest Iran war is that it follows a period in which circumstances were unfavorable to Russian and Chinese aims of increasing their influence in the Middle East.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The\u00a0fall of Assad\u00a0in December 2024 deprived Russia of its one reliable ally in the region. And\u00a0Trump\u2019s\u00a0May 2025 tour\u00a0of the Gulf states, in which he secured major technology and economic deals with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, was aimed at countering China\u2019s growing economic and\u00a0diplomatic influence\u00a0in those countries.<\/p>\n<p>With Washington perceived as an\u00a0increasingly unreliable protector, the Gulf states may seek\u00a0greater security and economic cooperation\u00a0elsewhere.<\/p>\n<h2>2. Taking US eyes off other strategic goals<\/h2>\n<p>In expanding military, diplomatic and economic ties in the Middle East, Russia and China over the past two decades were exploiting a desire by Washington to\u00a0move\u00a0its assets and attention away from the region following two\u00a0costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<p>Trump\u2019s decision to wage war against Iran directly contradicts the\u00a0national security strategy\u00a0his administration released in November 2025. According to the strategy, the administration would prioritize the Western Hemisphere and\u00a0the Indo-Pacific, while the Middle East\u2019s importance \u201cwill recede.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>In\u00a0co-launching a war in Tehran\u00a0with Israel, without any prior consultation with Washington\u2019s other allies, Trump has shown a complete disregard for their strategic and economic concerns. NATO, already riven by Trump\u2019s repeated threats to the alliance and designs on Greenland,\u00a0has now\u00a0shown\u00a0further signs of internal divisions.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>That offers benefits for China and Russia, which have long sought to capitalize on cracks between America and its allies.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The irony, again, is that the war in Iran came as Trump\u2019s vision of the U.S. as the hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere was making advances. International law and legitimacy concerns aside, Washington had\u00a0ousted\u00a0a thorn in its side\u00a0with Nicol\u00e1s Maduro in Venezuela and replaced him with a more compliant leader.<\/p>\n<h2>3. Disproportionate economic fallout<\/h2>\n<p>Iran\u2019s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where\u00a0some 20% of the world\u2019s oil\u00a0passes, was as predictable as it was destructive for U.S. interests.<\/p>\n<p>But for Russia, this meant higher oil prices that boosted its war economy. It also led to the\u00a0temporary but ongoing\u00a0easing of U.S. sanctions, which has provided Moscow an indispensable lifeline after years of economic pressure over the war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>While a prolonged closure and extensive damage to oil and natural gas infrastructure in Iran and the Gulf states no doubt hurts China\u2019s\u00a0energy security and economy, these were risks Xi appears willing to accept, at least for a time.<\/p>\n<p>And by building up a domestic oil reserve and diversifying energy sources to include solar, electric batteries and coal, China is far better positioned to weather a prolonged global\u00a0energy crisis than the U.S. Indeed, Beijing has made strides in recent year to\u00a0encourage domestic consumption\u00a0as a source of economic growth, rather than be so reliant on global trade. That may have given China some protection during the global economic shock caused by the Iran war, as well as push the economy further down its own track.<\/p>\n<p>The more the U.S. loses control over events in the strait, the more it loses influence in the region \u2013 especially as Iran\u00a0appears to be placing restrictions\u00a0on ships from unfriendly nations.<\/p>\n<h2>4. Loss of global leadership<\/h2>\n<p>Trump\u2019s\u00a0willingness,\u00a0to abandon talks to go to war, and the\u00a0contradictory rhetoric\u00a0he has employed throughout the Iran conflict, has weakened the perception of the U.S. as an honest broker.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>That provides a massive soft-power boost for Beijing. It was\u00a0China that\u00a0pressed Iran\u00a0to accept the 14-day ceasefire proposal brokered by Pakistan. Indeed, China has slowly chipped away at America\u2019s longtime status as global mediator of first resort.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Beijing has\u00a0successfully mediated\u00a0in the past between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and it\u00a0attempted to do the same\u00a0with Russia and Ukraine and\u00a0Israel and the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>In general, the Iran war adds weight to Beijing\u2019s worldview that the U.S.-led\u00a0liberal international order is over. Even if China benefited at some level from the war continuing, its decision to help broker the ceasefire shows that China is increasingly taking on the mantle of global leadership that the U.S. used to own.<\/p>\n<p>And for Russia, the Iran war and the rupture between Trump and America\u2019s NATO allies over their lack of support for it, shift world attention and U.S. involvement from the war in Ukraine.<svg class=\"content-tombstone\">\n<use xlink:href=\"http:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/static\/base\/svg\/spritesheet.svg#icon-d1-logo-tiny\"\/>\n<\/svg><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p><script>\n!function(f,b,e,v,n,t,s)\n{if(f.fbq)return;n=f.fbq=function(){n.callMethod?\nn.callMethod.apply(n,arguments):n.queue.push(arguments)};\nif(!f._fbq)f._fbq=n;n.push=n;n.loaded=!0;n.version='2.0';\nn.queue=[];t=b.createElement(e);t.async=!0;\nt.src=v;s=b.getElementsByTagName(e)[0];\ns.parentNode.insertBefore(t,s)}(window,document,'script',\n'https:\/\/connect.facebook.net\/en_US\/fbevents.js');\nfbq('init', '10155007044873614'); \nfbq('track', 'PageView');\n<\/script><script>\n  window.fbAsyncInit = function() {\n    FB.init({\n      appId      : '1546266055584988',\n      autoLogAppEvents : true,\n      xfbml      : true,\n      version    : 'v2.11'\n    });\n  };\n  (function(d, s, id){\n     var js, fjs = d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0];\n     if (d.getElementById(id)) {return;}\n     js = d.createElement(s); js.id = id;\n     js.src = \"https:\/\/connect.facebook.net\/en_US\/sdk.js\";\n     fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js, fjs);\n   }(document, 'script', 'facebook-jssdk'));\n<\/script><br \/>\n<br \/>Read the full article <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/ideas\/2026\/04\/war-iran-weakened-us-great-power\/412809\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">here<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u201cNever interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake\u201d\u2014Napoleon Bonaparte\u2019s\u00a0maxim\u2014may well have been in the minds of policymakers in Moscow and Beijing these past weeks, as the U.S. war in Iran dragged on. And now that a 14-day ceasefire between Tehran and Washington is in effect, with both sides claiming \u201cvictory,\u201d\u00a0Russian and Chinese leaders<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9635,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cdn.defenseone.com\/media\/img\/cd\/2026\/04\/13\/GettyImages_2270634149\/open-graph.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9634","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-defense"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9634","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9634"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9634\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9636,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9634\/revisions\/9636"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9635"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9634"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9634"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9634"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}