{"id":7908,"date":"2026-03-25T03:47:32","date_gmt":"2026-03-25T03:47:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/the-national-security-council-is-missing-in-action\/"},"modified":"2026-03-25T03:47:33","modified_gmt":"2026-03-25T03:47:33","slug":"the-national-security-council-is-missing-in-action","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/the-national-security-council-is-missing-in-action\/","title":{"rendered":"The National Security Council is missing in action"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<p>Three weeks into the U.S. war with Iran, it seems increasingly evident that President Donald Trump and his administration\u00a0miscalculated\u00a0how Iran would respond to attacks.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"3\">Besides appearing\u00a0unprepared\u00a0by the escalation of war, the president has offered contradictory statements on\u00a0the U.S. rationale\u00a0for bombing Iran, including that Iranian missiles could \u201csoon\u201d\u00a0rain down on American cities.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"7\">The administration\u2019s inconsistent rationale for waging war was laid bare on March 18, 2026, when Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence,\u00a0testified\u00a0before the Senate Intelligence Committee and declined to say whether her agency had made an estimate of if and when Iran would threaten the U.S. mainland.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"9\">\u201cIt is not the intelligence community\u2019s responsibility to determine what is and is not an imminent threat,\u201d Gabbard\u00a0said.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"11\">The statement was especially odd given that the briefing\u2019s subject was the U.S. intelligence community\u2019s latest global threat assessment. It\u2019s clear to me that neither Gabbard nor other members of the intelligence community were part of Trump\u2019s decision-making about going to war.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"12\">Besides\u00a0serving as chair\u00a0of the National Intelligence Council in the Barack Obama administration, I was a staff member of the National Security Council in the Jimmy Carter administration. I know that this apparent lack of a coordinated policy on Iran is a far cry from the war preparation and planning done during previous presidential administrations.<\/p>\n<h2 data-reader-unique-id=\"18\">National Security Council<\/h2>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"19\">Typically, the National Security Council, which consists of the Cabinet secretaries of the national security agencies, does its work through its committees, including the Deputies Committee, which is made up of the top deputies in those departments. The Deputies Committee reviews plans and assesses options, usually presenting a recommendation to the principals, including the president.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"20\">In that sense, the National Security Council is seen within an administration as the honest broker, especially in balancing the roles of the two main foreign affairs departments: the State Department and the Defense Department.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"21\">To be sure, different administrations have used the National Security Council in different ways.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"22\">President Dwight Eisenhower created\u00a0the modern National Security Council. His was an elaborate structure, with groups for both assessing options and overseeing implementation. It reflected his wartime experience, with careful staffing from a general staff whose responsibilities ranged from operations and logistics to intelligence and plans.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"24\">Other administrations have favored less formal arrangements. John F. Kennedy, for instance, kept discussions with the National Security Council\u00a0secret during the\u00a01962 Cuban missile crisis. But all the National Security Council stakeholders were represented, and Kennedy reached out to consult outside\u00a0expertise\u00a0on the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"has-media\" data-reader-unique-id=\"27\">\n<figcaption data-reader-unique-id=\"32\">President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden walk away from the lectern after Obama announced a nuclear deal with Iran on July 14, 2015.\u00a0AP Photo\/Andrew Harnik, Pool<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"36\">Lyndon Johnson made\u00a0Tuesday lunches\u00a0his forum for debating decisions about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Beginning with just his secretaries of state and defense, the lunches became a National Security Council meeting but in less formal circumstances. The CIA director, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the press secretary were later added to the group.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"38\">In other administrations at war, including the\u00a0George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush administrations in Iraq, the Deputies Committees would meet daily to assess progress and review options for what came next.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"40\">In the Obama administration, the National Intelligence Council I chaired supplied the intelligence support to the Deputies Committee. We provided a steady stream of intelligence assessments across various subjects. Those included pro-democracy protests during\u00a0the Arab Spring\u00a0in the 2010s to\u00a0Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea\u00a0in 2014 and the 2015\u00a0Iran nuclear deal.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"44\">The intelligence assessments provided the information \u2013 about where wars stood and what may come next \u2013 used for discussion among the deputies. They were discussions informed by experts on the Deputies Committee and from staff on the National Security Council who specialized in the region or military affairs.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"45\">This was nowhere better illustrated than in negotiating\u00a0the Obama administration\u2019s\u00a0nuclear agreement with Iran. The deal required bringing together experts on Iran and regional dynamics in the Middle East with experts on\u00a0nuclear fuel cycles\u00a0and the making of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n<h2 data-reader-unique-id=\"48\">Hardly seen<\/h2>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"49\">The Trump administration\u00a0cut\u00a0the National Security Council staff in half in May 2025, to around 150. The plan was to\u00a0streamline and restructure\u00a0national intelligence under Secretary of State Marco Rubio.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"52\">Since White Houses always want to pretend they are cheaper than they are, most staff with the National Security Council are seconded \u2013 or loaned for free \u2013 from one of the agencies. The process saves the White House money. But it also provides it with invaluable in-house expertise and exposes those seconded officials to presidential policymaking.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"53\">A friend and colleague who served as under secretary of defense quipped that every time he saw a State Department counterpart coming to a Deputies Committee meeting, he knew what was coming in substance: a request for a military solution to a geopolitical problem.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"54\">His stock answer: \u201cYes, we can do that, but it\u2019ll require 100,000 soldiers and cost US$10 billion.\u201d That answer was his quip, but the Deputies Committee provided a forum for arguing about the merits of the case.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"55\">The Trump administration in January 2025 outlined\u00a0the National Security Council structure in familiar terms. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman and\u00a0director of national intelligence, both a regular presence in debates in previous administrations, were made situational rather than regular members. They would attend as needed, not automatically.\u00a0<\/p>\n<figure class=\"has-media\" data-reader-unique-id=\"58\">\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"A man with a white hat and seated at a table listens to a woman speak to him.\" class=\"content-media content-img\" data-reader-unique-id=\"61\" loading=\"lazy\" sizes=\"(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px\" src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" srcset=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 600w, https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1200w, https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=600&amp;h=400&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 1800w, https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=1 754w, https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=30&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=2 1508w, https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/725392\/original\/file-20260322-57-9sn8hv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=15&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;h=503&amp;fit=crop&amp;dpr=3 2262w\"\/><\/p><figcaption data-reader-unique-id=\"63\">This photo provided by the White House shows President Donald Trump talking with White House chief of staff Susie Wiles as Secretary of State Marco Rubio listens at Mar-a-Lago during Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28, 2026.\u00a0Daniel Torok\/The White House via AP<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"67\">But the\u00a0National Security Council has\u00a0hardly been seen\u00a0since, unlike Trump\u2019s Cabinet, which gathers occasionally at meetings that often begin with Cabinet members\u00a0lavishing praise\u00a0on the president.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"70\">Brian Kilmeade of Fox News Radio\u00a0asked\u00a0Trump on March 13, 2026, about that inner circle.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"72\">\u201cIn your Cabinet with the vice president, secretary of state, what is it like, what are the dynamics when you have a big decision like Iran or Venezuela?\u201d Kilmeade asked. \u201cAre people speaking up and speaking their minds?\u201d<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"73\">Trump\u2019s answer spoke volumes.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"74\">\u201cThey do,\u201d the president said. \u201cI let them speak their mind, and they do. And we have some differences, but they, they never end up being much. I convince them all to, let\u2019s do it my way.\u201d<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"75\">Perhaps this casual approach to national security from the Trump administration should not surprise Americans after \u201cSignalgate\u201d \u2013 when administration officials in 2025 used the messaging app Signal rather than secure government modes to\u00a0discuss\u00a0U.S. military strikes on Yemen and inadvertently included a journalist in the communications.<\/p>\n<p data-reader-unique-id=\"78\">But when lives are at stake, not to mention\u00a0Americans\u2019 pocketbooks\u00a0and\u00a0the global economy, I think the nation deserves better. Conducting a war requires a hard-headed process for assessing progress and evaluating next steps. In other administrations, the National Security Council would have provided that.<svg class=\"content-tombstone\">\n<use xlink:href=\"http:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/static\/base\/svg\/spritesheet.svg#icon-d1-logo-tiny\"\/>\n<\/svg><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p><script>\n!function(f,b,e,v,n,t,s)\n{if(f.fbq)return;n=f.fbq=function(){n.callMethod?\nn.callMethod.apply(n,arguments):n.queue.push(arguments)};\nif(!f._fbq)f._fbq=n;n.push=n;n.loaded=!0;n.version='2.0';\nn.queue=[];t=b.createElement(e);t.async=!0;\nt.src=v;s=b.getElementsByTagName(e)[0];\ns.parentNode.insertBefore(t,s)}(window,document,'script',\n'https:\/\/connect.facebook.net\/en_US\/fbevents.js');\nfbq('init', '10155007044873614'); \nfbq('track', 'PageView');\n<\/script><script>\n  window.fbAsyncInit = function() {\n    FB.init({\n      appId      : '1546266055584988',\n      autoLogAppEvents : true,\n      xfbml      : true,\n      version    : 'v2.11'\n    });\n  };\n  (function(d, s, id){\n     var js, fjs = d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0];\n     if (d.getElementById(id)) {return;}\n     js = d.createElement(s); js.id = id;\n     js.src = \"https:\/\/connect.facebook.net\/en_US\/sdk.js\";\n     fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js, fjs);\n   }(document, 'script', 'facebook-jssdk'));\n<\/script><br \/>\n<br \/>Read the full article <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/ideas\/2026\/03\/national-security-council-missing\/412352\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">here<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Three weeks into the U.S. war with Iran, it seems increasingly evident that President Donald Trump and his administration\u00a0miscalculated\u00a0how Iran would respond to attacks. Besides appearing\u00a0unprepared\u00a0by the escalation of war, the president has offered contradictory statements on\u00a0the U.S. rationale\u00a0for bombing Iran, including that Iranian missiles could \u201csoon\u201d\u00a0rain down on American cities. The administration\u2019s inconsistent rationale<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":7909,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cdn.defenseone.com\/media\/img\/cd\/2026\/03\/24\/GettyImages_2267210366_1\/open-graph.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7908","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-defense"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7908","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7908"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7908\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7910,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7908\/revisions\/7910"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7909"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7908"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7908"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sawahsolutions.com\/range\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7908"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}